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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TERI LIN GODDARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 910241 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992), which grants original appellate juris-
diction to the Utah Supreme Court over appeals in criminal cases 
from the district court "involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony . . . ." Defendant, Teri Lin Goddard, was con-
victed of second degree murder, a first degree felony, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented in this brief for 
review: 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a guilty ver-
dict of second degree murder? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to grant 
-i-
defendant's motion to arrest the judgment or motion to dismiss in 
light of the trial court's dismissal of the depraved indifference 
variation of second degree murder? 
3. Did the trial court commit error by refusing to 
require separate verdicts for the two separate variations of sec-
ond degree murder? 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the 
defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered, 
exculpatory evidence unavailable at trial? 
5. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective because: 
(a) She failed to investigate circumstances sur-
rounding the State's theory of the case with respect to 
the blood spatter evidence? 
(b) She failed to challenge the medical examiner's 
qualifications to testify regarding blood spatter 
evidence? 
(c) She failed to object to the prosecutor's 
repeated questions on cross-examination of the defendant 
which asked the defendant why other witnesses would lie? 
Insufficiency of the evidence claims require an appellate 
court to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). If the 
evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, the appellate 
court must reverse the conviction. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 7 32, 
_o_ 
738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a 
trial court to arrest judgment if "the facts proved or admitted do 
not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, 
or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment." The 
appellate court may determine that judgment should have been 
arrested if the verdict was based on evidence "'so inherently 
improbable that no reasonable mind could believe it.1" State v. 
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State 
v, Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 252-53 (Utah 1980)). 
Appellate review of the trial court's refusal to give 
certain jury instructions involves a question of law. Therefore, 
the trial court's decision is accorded no deference and the deci-
sion is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Ramon 
v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A motion for new trial is governed by the standards set 
forth in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; a court 
may grant a new trial in the interest of justice if "there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse affect upon 
the rights of a party." The trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial is a matter of discretion and will 
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). 
Finally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim pre-
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sents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Where no claim of ineffectiveness has been 
presented to the trial court, an appellate court may review the 
record to determine on appeal whether counsel's performance con-
stituted ineffective assistance as a matter of law. Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 133-34 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Any statutes, rules or constitutional provisions relevant 
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text or 
addenda of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Teri Lin Goddard, was charged with one count 
of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990). (R. 7-9) 
The State initially alleged that Ms. Goddard killed her live-in 
boyfriend, Derek Hall either (a) intentionally or knowingly and/or 
intending to cause serious bodily injury, she committed an act 
clearly dangerous to life that resulted in his death and/or (c) 
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference 
to his life she engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death and thereby caused his death. (R. 7) (Addendum A) At the 
end of the State's case the defendant moved to dismiss the charge 
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alleging that the evidence had not shown either an intentional or 
knowing homicide or an intent to inflict bodily injury or action 
constituting depraved indifference to human life. (R. 177 at 
326.)1 The court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the 
first two variations of second degree homicide but took the motion 
to dismiss with respect to the third variation (i.e., depraved 
indifference) under advisement. (R. 177 at 337) Ultimately, the 
trial court dismissed the depraved indifference variation. (R. 
178 at 409) At the close of all evidence, the defendant moved for 
a directed verdict arguing that the evidence did not support an 
intentional or knowing homicide or a homicide committed with the 
intent to inflict serious bodily injury. (R. 178 at 546) The 
motion was denied by the trial court. (R. 178 at 546) At the 
conclusion of its deliberations, the jury convicted Ms. Goddard as 
charged. (R. 110, R. 178 at 553) 
Six days after the defendant's conviction, a hearing took 
place on the defendant's motion to arrest judgment. The defendant 
argued that the evidence demonstrating that the homicide was 
either an intentional or knowing act or that it was done with the 
intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim was incredi-
ble and thus, insufficient. (R. 120, R. 180 at 5) (Addendum B) 
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to arrest judgment. 
(R. 180 at 8). 
1All references are to record citations. The first page of each 
transcript volume is stamped with a record citation. Transcripts 
which are numbered or dated have the following record citations: 
T.I (10/9/90) . . . R.176 
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At the sentencing hearing the defendant moved to continue 
the proceeding arguing that new evidence was just becoming availa-
ble which would affect the trial court's decision on its motion to 
arrest judgment or would influence the trial court's sentencing 
decision. (R. 179 at 1) The motion was denied and the defendant 
was subsequently sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Utah 
State Prison of from five years to life and assessed fines and 
fees totalling $6,750.00. (R. 127) 
The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial. (R. 
124-25) (Addendum C) At the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial, the defendant argued that newly discovered evidence, spe-
cifically blood spatter evidence from a blood spatter expert, 
Judith Bunker, called into question physical evidence presented by 
the State and conclusions drawn by the State's expert, Dr. Sharon 
Schnittker. (R. 181 at 3-4) The defendant argued that Dr. 
Schnittker's trial testimony was a surprise to the defense. (R. 
181 at 5) The State argued that the evidence could in fact have 
been discovered by the defendant before trial. (R. 181 at 11) 
The trial court, after hearing arguments on both sides and evalu-
ating the evidence, denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
T.II (10/10/90) . . . R. 177 
T.III (10/11/92) . . . R. 178 
Transcript of 10/17/90 . . . R. 180 
Transcript of 12/07/90 . . . R. 179 
Transcript of 04/29/91 . . . R. 181 
Transcript of 11/19/91 . . . R. 182 
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(R. 181 at 17) From the conviction and judgment imposed upon her, 
defendant appeals. 
FACTS 
On June 1, 1990, the defendant, Teri Lin Goddard, and her 
seven-year-old son lived at 1235 LaFayette Drive in Salt Lake. 
Ms. Goddard's boyfriend, Derek Hall, also lived at that address. 
Mr. Hall was on parole and was in violation of his parole 
agreement. (R. 177 at 362) In fact, Mr. Hall was aware that a 
warrant had been issued for his arrest for the parole violation. 
(R. 177 at 363, 402) 
Throughout the day of June 1, 1990, Ms. Goddard and Mr. 
Hall were at their home drinking with friends. (R. 177 at 378-81) 
In the early evening hours, Mr. Hall went to another person's 
house on the block where he continued drinking; he was followed 
there by Ms. Goddard. (R. 177 at 382-85). From there, Mr. Hall 
went to the house of Frank Gutierrez, another neighbor who was in 
the vicinity, and there Mr. Hall continued drinking. (R. 176 at 
110) Also at the Gutierrez residence were Jay Jackson and at 
least two other women who were acquaintances of Mr. Gutierrez. 
(R. 176 at 109, 118) Sometime before 10:00 o'clock in the 
evening, Ms. Goddard arrived at Mr. Gutierrez's residence. While 
her original intention was to retrieve Mr. Hall, she soon joined 
in the party. (R. 178 at 438) 
Subsequently, Ms. Goddard engaged in an argument with at 
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least one of the two women at the party. (R. 176 at 118) To oth-
ers at the party, this argument seemed to be degenerating to the 
point that violence would soon ensue. (R. 176 at 125, 152) 
Gutierrez stated that the fighting amongst the women was so loud 
that he asked the women to leave his house. (R. 176 at 125) Mr. 
Hall had previously left the residence and had returned to his 
home. Ms. Goddard was angry with the other women when she left 
Mr. Gutierrez's house. (R. 176 at 118) In fact, Ms. Goddard tes-
tified that one of the women had physically threatened her and she 
was in fear for her own safety when she left Mr. Gutierrez's 
house. (R. 177 at 390) 
After leaving Gutierrez's house, Ms. Goddard went to her 
own home. There she retrieved a knife from a drawer in the 
kitchen because of her fear of the other women and her desire to 
protect herself from an anticipated attack. (R. 177 at 392) Ms. 
Goddard then walked into the living room where she found Mr. Hall. 
When she informed Mr. Hall of the reason for her fear and why she 
had the knife, Ms. Goddard stated that Mr. Hall yelled at her. 
(R. 177 at 396) Mr. Hall was aware of the warrant which had been 
issued for his arrest and wanted to avoid any situation which 
might bring the police and thus precipitate his arrest. (R. 177 
at 402) 
Ms. Goddard, the only witness to subsequent events, tes-
tified that Mr. Hall continued to yell at her. (R. 177 at 396) 
Ms. Goddard stated that Mr. Hall pushed her a number of times and 
- f t -
then grabbed her and pushed her into a rocking chair in the living 
room. (R. 177 at 397-98) Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall 
then kneeled between her legs while she was in a prone position in 
the rocker. (R. 177 at 399) Ms. Goddard was still holding the 
knife which she had obtained to defend herself from the women who 
had engaged in the argument with her earlier. (R. 177 at 399) 
Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall grabbed both of her hands and 
then leaned forward. As he leaned forward, the knife penetrated 
Mr. Hall's chest. (R. 177 at 399) Ms. Goddard stated that Mr. 
Hall looked at her and then stated, "What did you do, stab me in 
the heart?" (R. 177 at 399) Mr. Hall then pushed off from Ms. 
Goddard and fell over. (R. 177 at 400) Ms. Goddard testified 
that at first she believed Mr. Hall was playing some sort of prac-
tical joke. (R. 177 at 401) She then saw blood on Mr. Hall's 
chest and realized that Mr. Hall had been stabbed. (R. 177 at 
401) . 
Once she realized what had happened, Ms. Goddard became 
hysterical and ran throughout the neighborhood yelling for her 
neighbors to call the police and paramedics. (R. 177 at 402) The 
officers who subsequently arrived stated that Ms. Goddard was 
hysterical and that she made various statements questioning 
whether or not she had killed Mr. Hall and indicating that it was 
not her intention to harm him. (R. 177 at 177, 223, 231, 245) 
Medical testimony indicated that the knife had penetrated 
cartilage between the ribs, pierced the upper lobe of the right 
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lung, the pericardial sac, a portion of the heart, and the front 
portion of the aorta, (R. 177 at 262) Subsequent bleeding into 
the pericardial sac caused compression of the heart which was the 
cause of Mr. Hall's death. (R. 177 at 263) The medical examiner 
also testified that Mr. Hall had a small cut on his left palm. 
The medical examiner speculated that the wound might be a defen-
sive wound although the wound was so small that no bleeding 
resulted from it. (R. 177 at 267-268, 282) 
The prosecution originally theorized that Mr. Hall and 
Ms. Goddard were both standing when Ms. Goddard stabbed Mr. Hall. 
(R. 177 at 369) However, blood stains on the arm of the chair in 
which Ms. Hall stated she was positioned were inconsistent with 
this theory of the case. (R. 177 at 371) In rebuttal, the prose-
cution relied on the medical examiner, Dr. Sharon Schnittker, to 
rebut the defendant's version of the case. Dr. Schnittker testi-
fied that the defendant's version was "extremely unlikely" because 
of the absence of blood on her shirt which Dr. Schnittker claimed 
would have been present had Mr. Hall been in the position which 
Ms. Goddard claimed. (R. 178 at 485-87) The jury subsequently 
convicted Ms. Goddard as charged. 
After trial, Ms. Goddard's attorney filed a motion to 
arrest judgment arguing that Dr. Schnittker's refusal to change 
her opinion in the face of consistent hypothetical evidence which 
was presented to her during the trial left the jury with the erro-
neous impression that only Dr. Schnittkerfs view of the case was 
-i n -
consistent with the facts as presented by the prosecution. (R. 
180 at 3-4) The defense argued that Dr. Schnittker relied on her 
experience to ignore substantial evidence by the defense which 
indicated Ms. Goddard's innocence. (R. 180 at 4) The trial court 
denied the defendant's motion to arrest judgment. (R. 180 at 8) 
At the sentencing proceeding, the defendant moved to stay 
the proceeding, arguing that new evidence was being developed 
which would exonerate Ms. Goddard. (R. 179 at 1) That motion was 
ultimately denied and Ms. Goddard was sentenced. (R. 179 at 9) 
Subsequently, Ms. Goddard filed a motion for a new trial 
claiming that newly discovered evidence was exculpatory and should 
provide the basis for a new trial. The evidence in question was 
an affidavit from Judith Bunker, a nationally recognized blood 
spatter expert. Ms. Bunker's affidavit stated that blood spatter 
evidence at the scene and on the victim were entirely consistent 
with Ms. Goddard's version of the events. (R. 152-55) The 
defense argued that such new evidence should provide the court 
with the basis for ordering a new trial because of the thorough 
review of the evidence conducted by Ms. Bunker and the fact that 
the physical evidence in the case had not been reviewed by Dr. 
Schnittker before her testimony. (R. 181 at 4) Ultimately, the 
trial court denied Ms. Goddard1s motion for a new trial. (R. 181 
at 17) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Goddard first contends that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support a conviction of second degree murder. 
Specifically, Ms. Goddard asserts that even stretched to its lim-
its the evidence does not support the inference that she had the 
requisite mental state to commit the offense. 
Ms. Goddard next asserts that the trial court should have 
granted either her motion to dismiss, for a directed verdict or to 
arrest judgment because of lack of evidence of intent and because 
of the trial court's dismissal of the depraved indifference vari-
ant of second degree murder. According to prior decisions of this 
Court if evidence of depraved indifference was absent then evi-
dence of the other two variants of second degree murder was also 
absent. 
Ms. Goddard next alleges that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it refused to require the jury to be unani-
mous on the variation of second degree murder which it found. 
Because of the unusual circumstances of this case, previous case 
law on this issue is inapplicable. 
Ms. Goddard contends that new evidence discovered after 
trial justified granting her a new trial. The evidence from a 
blood spatter expert refuted testimony by the medical examiner and 
validated Ms. Goddard!s version of the events. 
Finally, Ms. Goddard asserts that she was deprived of her 
right to effective assistance of counsel. Her trial counsel 
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failed to investigate blood spatter evidence, failed to object to 
the medical examiner testifying as an expert in blood spatter 
interpretation, and failed to object to the prosecutor's questions 
to the defendant about other witness1 motives to lie. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER. 
The State initially charged Ms. Goddard with murder in 
the second degree, alleging that Ms. Goddard: (a) intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Derek Hall, and/or (b) intending to 
cause serious bodily injury to Derek Hall committed an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that caused his death, and/or (c) acting 
under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death and thereby 
caused Derek Hall's death. (R. 7) At the conclusion of the 
State's case, Ms. Goddard moved to dismiss the charge alleging 
that the evidence had not shown either an intentional or knowing 
homicide or that she acted with an intent to inflict serious bod-
ily injury or that her actions evidenced depraved indifference to 
human life. (R. 177 at 326) The court denied the motion to dis-
miss based on the first two variations of second degree homicide 
but took the motion to dismiss with respect to depraved indiffer-
ence under advisement. (R. 177 at 3 37) Ultimately, the trial 
- i -*-
court dismissed the depraved indifference variation. (R. 178 at 
409) At the close of all evidence, Ms. Goddard moved for a 
directed verdict arguing that the evidence did not support an 
intentional or knowing homicide or homicide committed with the 
intent to inflict serious bodily injury as required by the 
statute. (R. 178 at 546) The motion was denied by the trial 
court. (R. 178 at 546) After trial, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment. (R. 180 at 8) 
In reviewing an insufficiency claim, the appellate court 
must "review the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences 
from it, in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). If "the evidence and its 
inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that rea-
sonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted,1" then 
the appellate court must reverse the conviction. State v. Moore, 
802 P2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). "[S]o long as some evidence and 
reasonable inferences support the jury findings, [the appellate 
court] will not disturb them." Moore, 802 P.2d at 738. While 
noting the deference due evidence which supports a jury's verdict, 
this Court stated in Petree that: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must 
cover the gap between the presumption of inno-
cence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of 
its duty to review the evidence and all infer-
ences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost 
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
659 P.2d at 445. In this case, there is no question that Teri 
Goddard held the knife which killed Derek Hall. However, a sig-
nificant gap in the evidence concerning the required mens rea is 
present and only a speculative leap across the gap in the 
stretched evidence provides the basis for a conviction of Ms. 
Goddard. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
the evidence against Ms. Goddard which supports the mens rea 
required to establish second degree homicide is as follows: 
Christine Grogan, who lived in the neighborhood, testified that on 
the night of June 1, 1990, at approximately 7:00 p.m. she observed 
Ms. Goddard screaming at Frank Gutierrez's truck as it went around 
the corner. Ms. Grogan testified that Ms. Goddard screamed, 
"Don't come back here or I'll kill you. You stay the hell away 
from me." (R. 176 at 90) However, Ms. Grogan saw only Frank 
Gutierrez in the truck and specifically testified, "I did not know 
that Derek was in the truck that night." (R. 176 at 90, 95) 
Sometime later, Ms. Grogan was informed by Frank Gutierrez that 
Derek was in the truck. (R. 176 at 95) Ms. Grogan specifically 
said that the incident was not unusual to her and that, at the 
time, she "didn't think anything of it." (R. 176 at 90) 
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Frank Gutierrez, another neighbor, testified that the 
victim, Derek Hall, was at his house for a large portion of the 
evening of June 1. Mr. Gutierrez testified that sometime during 
the course of the evening he and Mr. Hall drove in Mr. Gutierrez's 
truck to purchase gas and beer. (R. 176 at 111) Mr. Gutierrez 
testified that he neither heard nor saw Ms. Goddard during the 
trip. (R. 176 at 111, 112) Among other things, Mr. Gutierrez 
testified that sometime after Ms. Goddard joined the party during 
the evening, she put his hands on her breasts in an effort to get 
Mr. Hall angry. (R. 176 at 116) However, the speculation as to 
Ms. Goddardfs motives in allegedly performing this action was 
stricken. (R. 176 at 116) During cross-examination, Mr. 
Gutierrez testified that he perceived Ms. Goddardfs actions as a 
joke. (R. 176 at 130) Finally, Mr. Gutierrez testified that when 
Mr. Hall left, Mr. Hall seemed to be feeling good and "he seemed 
to be happy." (R. 176 at 113) Mr. Gutierrez testified that while 
Ms. Goddard was "a little angry" when she left the party, after 
Mr. Hall, her departure occurred immediately following what others 
characterized as a heated argument between Ms. Goddard and two 
other women. (R. 176 at 118, 152) 
Another neighbor, Beth Steed, testified that in the early 
morning hours of June 2, 1990, she was awakened by loud voices 
coming from the Goddard home. (R. 176 at 155-56) While Ms. Steed 
was able to identify both a male and a female voice, she was una-
ble to discern what was being said. (R. 176 at 156) 
Finally, a crucial portion of the State's case against 
Ms. Goddard regarding her intent on the evening in question con-
cerned the State's theory of how the homicide occurred. Ms. 
Goddard asserted that Mr. Hall's death was an accident. (R. 177 
at 404) The testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the Associate 
State Medical Examiner, was critical to the State's contention 
that Mr. Hall's death was not accidental and had the effect of 
demonstrating Ms. Goddard's intent to kill Mr. Hall or to inflict 
serious bodily injury. Dr. Schnittker testified that Mr. Hall had 
a single, small stab wound to the chest. (R. 177 at 261) The 
wound penetrated the cartilage between the ribs, the upper lobe of 
the right lung, pierced the pericardial sac, then entered the 
heart and the large aorta. (R. 177 at 262) Dr. Schnittker testi-
fied that in her opinion the fatal wound was inflicted by a thrust 
of the knife rather than Mr. Hall's falling on the knife. (R. 177 
at 275) Dr. Schnittker also testified that Mr. Hall suffered what 
she speculated could have been a "defensive wound" on the left 
palm. The wound did not cause any bleeding and was a cut so 
insignificant that the photograph of the cut required placement of 
a paper arrow to show the position of the cut. (R. 177 at 264-78, 
282) 
Ms. Goddard testified that she ran from Frank Gutierrez's 
house after engaging in a heated argument with two other women 
concerning one of the other women's desires to obtain cocaine. 
(R. 177 at 366-90) Ms. Goddard testified that she was very 
-1 7-
frightened that the women would pursue her to her home. (R. 177 
at 391) Ms. Goddard testified that she obtained the knife from 
her kitchen when she entered her house to protect herself from the 
women at Mr. Gutierrez's house and not from Derek Hall. (R. 177 
at 392) When she informed Mr. Hall of why she had the knife, he 
became concerned that the confrontation and fight would move to 
his residence. Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall knew of a war-
rant for his arrest and was afraid that any incident which brought 
the police to his house would result in his arrest. (R. 177 at 
402) Therefore, Mr. Hall started yelling at Ms. Goddard and push-
ing her. Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall grabbed her and 
pushed her into the rocking chair which was in the living room. 
(R. 177 at 397-98) Ms. Goddard landed in a nearly prone position 
in the chair. (R. 177 at 398) Ms. Goddard was holding the knife 
between her thumb and forefinger with the blade extending outward. 
(R. 177 at 398) Mr. Hall was in a kneeling position between Ms. 
Goddard's legs and was holding both of her arms above the elbow. 
(R. 177 at 399) Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall then grabbed 
the hand which was holding the knife with his hand. (R. 177 at 
399) Ms. Goddard testified: 
[Mr. Hall] leaned down on top of me, like he 
leaned on me, and then I remember, you know, I 
remember him looking at me and I was looking at 
him and then I remember him saying, what did you 
do, stab me in the heart. And then I remember 
looking down. He was still kind of lying on me. 
And I remember thinking oh my God, I think, oh my 
God, then I remember him, . . . remember him 
dropping his arm down there and then he leaned, 
he fell to the side of the chair, and he dropped 
his hand back this way down here and then he came 
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back. And then I remember him going up off the 
top of me. And I don!t remember him falling, him 
standing, or what happened at that time. 
(R. 177 at 399-400) Ms. Goddard testified that she just remem-
bered pushing Mr. Hall off of her and his falling. (R. 177 at 
400) 
In contravention of Ms. Goddardfs version of the events, 
Dr. Schnittker testified that, in her opinion, Mr. Hall did not 
fall forward "for any period of time." (R. 177 at 274) Dr. 
Schnittker also testified that, in her opinion, the force required 
to inflict the wound was more of a "directed force" and more than 
would be obtained by Mr. Hall's falling on the knife. (R. 177 at 
274-75) However, Dr. Schnittker also testified that holding a per-
son's arms could fix the knife sufficiently to cause the wound if 
the victim fell on the knife. (R. 177 at 279-80) Dr. Schnittker 
stated that the wound was in a horizontal plane, i.e. it was not 
inflicted with either an upward or downward stabbing motion. (R. 
177 at 297) Dr. Schnittker assumed that Mr. Hall was standing 
when the fatal wound was inflicted. (R. 177 at 311-12) However, 
despite the fact that Mr. Hall's body was found in a backward 
kneeling position with his feet and lower legs underneath the 
upper portion of his legs, Dr. Schnittker found no bruises on Mr. 
Hall's knees. (R. 177 at 309) 
After Ms. Goddard's testimony, Dr. Schnittker testified 
in rebuttal. She testified that Ms. Goddard's version was 
"extremely unlikely" because of the lack of blood on the front of 
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Ms. Goddard1s shirt. Dr. Schnittker stated that immediately fol-
lowing infliction of the wound "some drops of blood" would have 
fallen on the shirt. (R. 178 at 485) Finally, Dr. Schnittker 
testified: 
Q. (by the prosecutor): How likely is it, in your 
best judgment, that the — as to the likelihood 
of the wound being inflicted into the body of 
Derek Hall in the manner described [by Teri 
Goddard]? 
A.: Well, in my opinion it is extremely unlikely 
and there's certain, three inconsistencies, the 
most major of which is the lack of blood on 
either his left hand or her pink sweat shirt. 
Second would be that I see no plausible rea-
son why, with the stabilization of his body that 
Mr. Derek Hall would have [fallen forward]. 
(R. 178 at 487) Dr. Schnittker also testified that other incon-
sistencies convinced her that the version of events portrayed by 
Ms. Goddard could not have occurred. (R. 178 at 487-88) From 
this evidence, the jury concluded that Ms. Goddard had the requi-
site intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily injury upon Mr. 
Hall sufficient to convict her of second degree homicide. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) defines second degree 
murder as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, he engages 
in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another; 
or 
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(d) while in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the commis-
sion or attempted commission of [several enumer-
ated offenses] causes the death of another person 
other than a party as defined in §76-2-202. 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of 
the first degree. 
In this case subsections (a), (b), and (c) were originally charged 
by the prosecution. During the course of the trial, the trial 
court granted the defense motion to drop the depraved indifference 
variation, subsection (c). Therefore, to find the defendant 
guilty, the jury had to find culpable mental states of either (a) 
an intent to kill or (b) an intent to inflict serious bodily 
injury. 
In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), this 
Court explained the degree of mental culpability required for a 
finding of guilt on a second degree murder charge. The Court 
stated: 
[The terms used to identify the mental state 
in the statute] are comparable to the old malice 
aforethought, but are much more precise and less 
confusing. The statute treats these forms of 
homicide as having similar culpability. Second 
degree murder is based on a very high degree of 
moral culpability. That culpability arises 
either from an actual intent to kill or from a 
mental state that is essentially equivalent 
thereto — such as intending grievous bodily 
injury and knowingly creating a very high risk of 
death. The risk of death in the latter two 
instances must be so great as to evidence such an 
indifference to life as to be tantamount to that 
evidenced by an intent to kill. In contrast, the 
felony-murder provision of the second degree mur-
der statute is something of an exception to the 
above principle, as it does not require an intent 
to kill or any similar mental state. 
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769 P.2d at 259. In short, either of the mental states required 
to convict Ms. Goddard must have been the equivalent of an intent 
to kill. See also State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985). 
The evidence in this case does not support an inference 
by the jury of an intent to kill. While some evidence indicates 
that Ms. Goddard may have been upset with Mr. Hall earlier in the 
evening, the evidence qualitatively deficient. For example, 
Christine Grogan, who testified that she heard Ms. Goddard yell at 
Frank Gutierrez's pickup, also testified that she did not see Mr. 
Hall in the pickup. Furthermore, Ms. Grogan stated that she 
thought nothing of Ms. Goddard1s screaming at the Gutierrez truck. 
Mr. Gutierrez testified that he neither saw nor heard Ms. Goddard 
on his trip to the store with Mr. Hall. Later in the evening, at 
the Gutierrez house, Frank Gutierrez testified that Ms. Goddard 
placed his hands on her breasts, that he was sure Mr. Hall saw the 
action, but that he considered the action to be nothing more than 
a joke. Mr. Gutierrez testified that when Mr. Hall left the 
party, he left the party in a happy emotional state. Those who 
witnessed the events at the party testified that while Ms. 
Goddard left the party upset and angry, her anger was directed not 
at Mr. Hall but at the women with whom she had just engaged in a 
verbal confrontation. Ms. Goddard herself testified that she was 
frightened for her own safety when she went to her house. She 
testified that while Mr. Hall became upset with her because of his 
fear that the police would arrive and arrest him, she intended no 
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harm to Mr. Hall. 
The primary inference of intent is found in the testimony 
of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the medical examiner. From the nature 
of the wound, Schnittker concluded that the wound must have 
resulted from a thrusting motion. However, even Schnittker con-
ceded that she had "no idea of the exact amount of force" used to 
administer the wound. (R. 137 at 289) Schnittkerfs other damag-
ing testimony concerned the lack of blood spatter patterns which 
she believed would have been present had the incident occurred as 
Ms. Goddard described. However, given Schnittkerfs equivocation 
on the first point and speculation on the second, the evidence was 
simply insufficient to conclude that Ms. Goddard had the requisite 
intent to kill which is required to convict of second degree 
murder. 
Those who saw Ms. Goddard immediately following the inci-
dent all described her as hysterical and repentant. For example, 
Ms. Louise Miyatake, a neighbor, testified that Ms. Goddard was 
very upset and hysterical and that she approached the police as 
soon as she saw police cars arrive in the neighborhood. (R. 176 
at 164-68) Robert Hawke, one of the first Salt Lake City police 
officers on the scene, testified that Ms. Goddard was hysterical 
when he arrived and that she asked "Did I kill him? I didn't mean 
to." (R. 177 at 177) Robert Linton, another Salt Lake City 
police officer, testified that Ms. Goddard was hysterical, that 
she waived him down while he was still in the car and pleaded with 
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him to "go help [Mr. Hall]." (R. 177 at 223) Several other Salt 
Lake City officers testified that Ms. Goddard was hysterical when 
they arrived. (R. 177 at 231, 237, 245, 324) Ms. Goddard's 
actions immediately following the stabbing of Mr. Hall were 
totally inconsistent with an intent to kill that the State hypoth-
esized she possessed mere minutes before. 
Nothing in the evidence provides a sufficient basis for 
the inference of an intent to kill which is prerequisite for 
conviction of second degree murder. While a jury is free to infer 
the requisite mental state to convict a defendant of a crime, the 
jury may not speculate on what the defendant's mental state in 
fact was. This conviction was based on nothing more than 
speculation and must be reversed. 
POINT II 
GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE VARIATION, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS, 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND TO ARREST JUDGMENT. 
During trial the defense made motions to dismiss and for 
a directed verdict based on the lack of the requisite mental 
state. (R. 177 at 326-37, R. 178 at 409, 546) The trial court 
granted the defense motion to preclude the depraved indifference 
variation of second degree murder. (R. 178 at 409) While not 
specifically articulating the reasons for the decision, the trial 
court must have concluded that the requisite mental state to sup-
port the depraved indifference variant was lacking. After trial, 
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the defense moved to arrest judgment arguing that the evidence of 
intent, particularly that provided by Dr. Schnittker, was not 
credible and therefore, not sufficient to sustain a guilty 
verdict,2 (R. 120, R. 180 at 1-8) Based on the trial court's 
dismissal of the depraved indifference variant and the case law 
from this Court, one of the motions should have been granted. 
In State v. Sandiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the 
Court held that the first three variants of second degree murder 
were essentially identical. 769 P.2d 259. Previously, in State 
v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), the Court held that a jury 
need not be unanimous in deciding which of the first three vari-
ants of second degree murder is applicable in any particular case 
because the variants are virtually equivalent. In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Stewart indicated his concern that the lead opin-
ion not be applied to crimes other than second degree murder. 
Justice Stewart concluded that "because their mental states are so 
highly similar, from the point of view of mental functioning and 
culpability, I think the jury was for essential constitutional 
purposes unanimous on the mens rea element." 733 P.2d at 170. 
After an extensive analysis of the Utah provision and comparison 
with the Model Penal Code, Justice Stewart stated that he con-
curred with the lead opinion's result because: 
Despite . . . departure from the Model Penal 
Code, it is clear from Russell, 106 Utah 116, 
145 P.2d 1003, and the MPC Commentary that all 
2Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure defines 
when a trial court may arrest judgment in a criminal case: 
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the mental states in §76-5-203(1)(a), (b), (c) 
are essentially forms of common law malice 
aforethought. Each is at least "an intention or 
design previously formed to do an act or admit to 
an act, knowing that the reasonable and natural 
consequences thereof would be likely to cause 
death or great bodily injury." Russell, 106 Utah 
at 126, 145 P.2d at 1007. 
Not only is each mental state in the Utah 
statute a form of common law malice aforethought 
but each one also amounts to a varied form of 
depraved indifference murder. Certainly, inten-
tionally causing death demonstrates depraved 
indifference to the value of the life taken 
Therefore, a juror who finds that a defendant 
intentionally or knowingly committed a homicide 
must necessarily find depraved indifference 
because a defendant who intends to kill is aware 
that his conduct creates a grave risk of death. 
A person who intends to cause serious bodily 
injury while doing an act "clearly dangerous" to 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, 
the court, upon its own initiative may, or upon 
motion of the defendant shall, arrest judgment if 
the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a 
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, 
or there is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, 
unless it be judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order 
a commitment until the defendant is charged anew 
or retried, or may enter any other order that may 
be just and proper under the circumstances. 
In State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah 1980), this Court 
stated that a trial judge may intrude upon a jury's verdict and 
substitute his judgment therefor "if he can rule as a matter of 
law." In State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), the court of appeals, after contrasting the Utah provision 
with its federal counterpart, stated that a judgment may be 
arrested "based on an insufficiency of the evidence or facts as 
proved in trial or as admitted by the parties." Therefore, a 
judgment may be arrested by a trial court based on either the 
facts or the law. In this case the trial court should have 
arrested judgment based on the facts and law. 
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human life, also acts with a depraved indiffer-
ence to the value of human life. Serious bodily 
injury is defined as "bodily injury that creates 
or causes serious prominent disfigurement, pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ or creates a substantial 
risk of death." §76-1-601(9). A person whose 
"conscious objective or desire" is to cause that 
type of injury while committing an act clearly 
dangerous to human life, §76-2-103(1), also dem-
onstrates depraved indifference. The objective 
depraved indifference judgment is made out when 
the nature of injury the defendant intends to 
cause is "serious," as opposed to "slight." . . . 
It follows that regardless of which mental 
state individual jurors relied upon in reaching 
this verdict, all agreed that the defendant know-
ingly engaged in conduct that created a grave 
risk of death of the victim and that he acted 
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indif-
ference to human life. 
7 33 P.2d at 17 3-74. Justice Stewartfs opinion in Russell formed 
the basis for the decision in Standiford and is reflected in the 
lengthy discussion of depraved indifference contained in 
Standiford. 
According to this analysis, the depraved indifference 
variation of second degree murder is necessarily subsumed in var-
iations a and b of second degree murder. Even if variations a and 
b are absent, the depraved indifference variation may still be 
present. This is so because the three variations form a continuum 
of mental states. Depraved indifference is more than the reck-
lessness required for manslaughter but less than the intentional 
killing defined in variation a of the second degree murder 
statute. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 261-64. Depraved indifference 
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is the least common denominator for the first three variants of 
second degree murder. However, any time either of the first two 
variations is present, the depraved indifference variation will 
also be present, because all three variations evidence at least 
depraved indifference. 
In this case, the trial judge concluded that the depraved 
indifference variation, the variation which Justice Stewart and 
the Court concluded must be present when either variations a or b 
are present, was absent. However, that conclusion conflicts with 
Russell and Standiford which hold that depraved indifference is 
always present when either variation a or b is present. Thus, 
according to Russell and Standiford, when the trial court con-
cluded that there was insufficient evidence to allow the depraved 
indifference variation to go to the jury, it also necessarily con-
cluded that neither of the other two variations which require a 
greater mens rea than the depraved indifference variation were 
also unsupported by the evidence. When the trial court dismissed 
the depraved indifference variation, it should also have dismissed 
the other two variations. Its failure to do so is inconsistent 
with the case law of this jurisdiction. Having concluded that the 
evidence did not support the depraved indifference murder, the 
trial court simply must have concluded that the evidence was 
insufficient to support either of the other two variations which 
are "form[s] of depraved indifference murder." 
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POINT III 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO 
REQUIRE THE JURY TO UNANIMOUSLY DECIDE WHICH 
VARIATION OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
MS. GODDARD COMMITTED. 
The defense requested that the trial court submit each of 
the remaining two variations of second degree murder to the jury 
on individual verdicts. The defense requested that the jury 
return a unanimous verdict as to which variation of second degree 
Ms. Goddard was committed. (R. 178 at 547) During closing 
arguments, the prosecution argued that some of the jurors could 
believe that Ms. Goddard committed one variant of second degree 
murder while others could believe she committed the other variant 
of second degree murder. (R. 178 at 526) 
In Russell, this Court held that a jury does not have to 
be unanimous in deciding which of the three possible mental states 
is present in convicting of second degree murder, as long as the 
jurors all agreed that at least one of the culpable mental states 
is present. However, Russell contains the caveat that "if the 
statute under which the defendant is convicted actually defines 
more than one crime, not merely one crime which may be committed 
in several different ways, the defendant is entitled to jury una-
nimity on which crime he is guilty of committing." 7 33 P.2d at 
166-67. 
If the Court finds that the trial court was correct in 
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
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depraved indifference variation but sufficient to support either 
variation a or b, then the court should reconsider the jury una-
nimity issue. If second degree murder is one crime that may be 
committed in three different ways, than insufficiency of the evi-
dence with respect to the "lowest" way should mean that the evi-
dence was insufficient with respect to the other two ways. See, 
e.g. Russell, 733 P.2d at 178 (Durham, J. concurring). However, 
if as the trial court found, sufficient evidence may sustain a 
conviction on variation a or b but not on variation c, then the 
variations are apparently not closely connected as the court indi-
cated in Russell and the question of jury unanimity on the mental 
element should be reevaluated. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT REFUSED TO GRANT MS. GODDARD A NEW 
TRIAL BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
(a) the court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of the parties. 
This Court has stated that "newly discovered evidence should clar-
ify a fact that was contested and resolved against the movant, or 
be sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial might be 
changed . . . ." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988). 
In this case the defense moved for a new trial after Ms. 
Goddard's sentencing because of newly discovered evidence concern-
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ing blood spattering. As noted above, Dr. Schnittkerfs testimony 
concerning her interpretation of the blood spatters in this case 
was crucial to prove the State's theory of the case and to dis-
credit Ms. Goddard's version of the events. After trial, defense 
counsel procured the services of Ms. Judith Bunker, a nationally 
recognized blood spatter expert. Ms. Bunker analyzed all of the 
evidence in the case as well as Dr. Schnittkerfs testimony. Dr. 
Schnittker had met Ms. Bunker while Dr. Schnittker was attending 
a seminar given by Ms. Bunker. (R. 179 at 8) 
Ms. Bunker's report which was presented to the trial 
court concluded: 
1. [Mr. Hall] was directly above and in contact 
with the front of the right armrest when blood 
flowed from his wound, prior to falling back onto 
the floor. 
2. The stains located on the inner armrest near 
the backrest indicate the rocker was on its back 
when this bloodshed occurred. 
3. The location of the rocker stains along with 
the final body position strongly suggest the sub-
ject was on his knees when the wound was 
inflicted. This is also suggested by the pres-
ence of flow on subject's left lower pant leg. 
4. Ms. Goddard was in the rocker when blood shed 
occurred. Her right arm was in front of her when 
blood flowed onto the back of her sleeve from 
above. 
5. She removed herself from the rocker by climb-
ing over the right arm rest, transferring blood 
stains and patterns onto the back of her jeans. 
6. There is no blood stain evidence to suggest 
that blood spurted or otherwise projected from 
the wound site at any point following the inflic-
tion of the wound. 
(R. 155) (The complete report is included as Addendum D) Not 
only did Ms. Bunker's evidence challenge Dr. Schnittker's 
-31-
credibility, it also provided clarification of highly contested 
fact at issue in the trial, i.e. whether Mr. Hall was standing 
when the fatal wound was inflicted, as the prosecution contended, 
or whether he was kneeling, as the defense contended. Ms. 
Bunkerfs evidence resolved the issue in favor of the defense. 
Furthermore, the evidence was sufficiently persuasive that the 
results of the trial might have been changed. The evidence sup-
ported Ms. Goddard's version of the events. 
In responding to the defense argument during the motion 
for a new trial, the prosecutor conceded that Ms. Bunker's conclu-
sions could be correct but they did not contradict the State's 
evidence during trial. (R. 181 at 9) For example, the prosecutor 
stated that Ms. Bunker's conclusion that Mr. Hall was on his knees 
when the wound was inflicted was "not inconsistent with any of the 
testimony that Dr. Schnittker gave." (R. 181 at 9) However, the 
transcript of the trial reveals that Dr. Schnittker employed hypo-
thetical situations during her testimony in which Mr. Hall wasin a 
standing position when the wound was inflicted. (R. 177 at 311, 
312) One may also deduce from Ms. Bunker's conclusion that 
because Mr. Hall was directly above the right arm rest of the 
rocker and Ms. Goddard was in the rocker when the fatal wound was 
inflicted, that Mr. Hall was above Ms. Goddard when the wound was 
inflicted. However, Dr. Schnittker testified in rebuttal that 
this could not be the scenario when the wound was inflicted. 
Without reviewing the transcripts of the trial, the trial 
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court concluded that the evidence presented by Ms. Bunker was not 
inconsistent with the trial testimony. However, comparison of the 
trial transcript and Ms. Bunker's evidence clearly indicates that 
Ms. Bunker's evidence supports the defense theory of the case and 
not the prosecutions. The evidence presented by the defense clar-
ified a fact that was contested and resolved against Ms. Goddard. 
The evidence corroborated Ms. Goddard's story and, considering the 
source of the evidence, was probably sufficiently persuasive to 
have changed the trial result. A new trial should have been 
granted based on the new evidence presented by the defense. 
POINT V 
MS. GODDARD'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. 
Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
are addressed by collateral attack in a habeas corpus proceeding; 
however, in some circumstances, the claims may be raised on direct 
appeal. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Those circumstances appear when the defendant is represented by 
new counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the 
issues. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
133-34 (3d Cir. 1984) The circumstances are present for this 
court to review the ineffectiveness claims raised in this case on 
direct appeal. 
In cases involving ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts 
have adopted the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984): 
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First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This, requires a 
showing that that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose results are reliable. 
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). In 
short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must demon-
strate deficient performance which resulted in prejudice. 
In this case, Ms. Goddard contends that her trial counsel 
was ineffective because (1) she failed to investigate circum-
stances surrounding blood spatter evidence until after the trial; 
(2) she failed to challenge the medical examiner's qualifications 
to testify regarding blood spatter evidence; and (3) she failed to 
object to the prosecutor's repeated questions on cross-examination 
of the defendant which asked the defendant why other witnesses 
would lie. 
A. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective Because She Failed to 
Investigate Circumstances Surrounding the State's Blood Spatter 
Evidence Until After the Trial. 
During the course of argument in the hearing on a motion 
for a new trial, defense counsel indicated that the blood spatter 
testimony offered by the prosecution "came as a surprise to the 
defense in this case . . . ." (R. 181 at 5) In responding to the 
defendant's motion, the prosecutor argued that "this is the kind 
of evidence that could have been discovered by the defendant with 
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due diligence prior to trial-" (R. 181 at 11) The defense had 
conducted no investigation regarding blood spatter evidence prior 
to the trial in this case. 
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the defen-
dant alleged that his trial counsel had been ineffective because 
he failed to investigate the availability of prospective defense 
witnesses. The defendant had provided counsel with a list of pro-
spective witnesses but counsel did not contact several of the peo-
ple on the list. 805 P.2d at 187. This Court concluded: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate 
the underlying facts of the case, including the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses, 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the 
"wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." This is because the decision not to 
investigate cannot be considered a tactical 
decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry 
has been made that counsel can make a reasonable 
decision to call or not to call particular wit-
nesses for tactical reasons. Therefore, because 
defendant's trial counsel did not make a reason-
able investigation into the possibility of pro-
curing prospective defense witnesses, the first 
part of the Strickland test has been met. 
805 P.2d at 188. 
In State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
the court of appeals held that a defense attorney's failure to 
subpoena or even review critical records, his failure to contact 
an important witness, and his failure to prepare the defendant and 
his wife for their trial testimony constituted prejudicial defi-
cient performance. 771 P.2d at 1090-91. The court stated: 
"Certainly, there can be no appropriate performance in the court-
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room without adequate preparation, and without such preparation, 
representation is nothing but a sham and a pretense." 771 P.2d at 
1092. 
Just as in Tempiin and Crestani, in this case counsel 
totally failed to undertake an investigation concerning critical 
evidence. Blood spatters were clearly located in the room where 
Mr. Hall died and were visible in various photographs that had 
been provided to defense counsel during the discovery process. 
Furthermore, the assertion that the blood spatter evidence at 
trial was a surprise to the defense is belied by the fact that Dr. 
Schnittker discussed blood spattering during the preliminary 
hearing. (Addendum E) Defense counsel should have anticipated 
that at trial the prosecution would attempt to explain the blood 
spattering in a manner which was inconsistent with Ms. Goddard's 
version of the events.3 Counsel's decision not to investigate 
simply cannot be considered a tactical decision. Rather, it is 
defective performance which satisfies the first prong of the 
Strickland test. 
In Tempiin, the Court found that the second prong of the 
Strickland test was also met. The Court determined that the tes-
timony which counsel would have uncovered had he adequately inves-
tigated the list of witnesses provided by the defendant would have 
reflected on the credibility of the victim in the case by contra-
3If defense counsel should have undertaken such an investigation 
into the blood spatter evidence, then her failure to do so was 
defective performance which satisfies the first prong of the 
Strickland standard. If, however, the Court determines that 
- ^ f i -
dieting several aspects of the victim's testimony. 805 P.2d at 
188. The court determined that such a contradiction would be 
important in the case because the victim's testimony was the only 
direct evidence of the defendant's guilt and thus affected the 
"entire evidentiary picture." 805 P.2d at 188. 
Similarly, in this case, Ms. Bunker's testimony reflected 
upon the credibility of Dr. Schnittker and contradicted several 
aspects of Schnittker's testimony. Of all the prosecution 
witnesses, only Dr. Schnittker testified that Ms. Goddard's ver-
sion of the events was "extremely unlikely" and contained "serious 
inconsistencies." Dr. Schnittker alone refuted Ms. Goddard's 
testimony and refused to alter her interpretation on cross-
examination.4 Therefore, just as in Tempiin, defense counsel's 
failure to procure a critical defense witnesses to testify at 
trial affected the "entire evidentiary picture" of the trial. Had 
Ms. Bunker testified at the trial, a different outcome, one more 
favorable to Ms. Goddard, was likely. 
B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective Because She Failed to 
Challenge Dr. Schnittker's Qualifications to Testify Regarding 
Blood Spatter Evidence. 
defense counsel reasonably could not have foreseen the State's 
blood spatter evidence in a manner contrary to that proposed by 
Ms. Goddard's version of the event, then the evidence truly must 
be considered a surprise as counsel stated during argument in the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial. Under that standard, the 
"surprise" testimony should have resulted in the trial court's 
giving more deference to Ms. Bunker's evidence presented at the 
hearing and granting a new trial. 
4The impenetrability of Dr. Schnittker's testimony is clearly dem-
onstrated by defense counsel's remark to Dr. Schnittker after try-
ing to shake Dr. Schnittker's theory of the case. Defense counsel 
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To refute Ms. Goddard's version of the events which 
resulted in Mr. Hallfs death, the prosecution called as its first 
rebuttal witness Dr. Schnittker. The prosecutor first related a 
hypothetical question which mirrored the events as stated by Ms. 
Goddard. Then the prosecutor asked Dr. Schnittkerfs opinion con-
cerning the likelihood of the events related by the defendant. 
During the latter testimony, Dr. Schnittker started offering tes-
timony concerning the blood spatters found on Mr. Hall, Ms. 
Goddard, and at the scene. Defense counsel made no objection to 
Dr. Schnittkerfs testimony concerning the blood spatter evidence 
even though the prosecutor had not qualified Dr. Schnittker as an 
expert in the area of blood spatter evidence. 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. 
While the courts of this state have not thoroughly defined the 
requirements for an individual to testify as an expert, this Court 
has stated that extensive qualifications, either by way of aca-
demic training or experience, are necessary in an area of exper-
stated, "Doctor, I give up." (R. 178 at 49 3) Clearly, both Ms. 
Goddard and defense counsel would have benefited by Ms. Bunker's 
testimony at trial. 
--*«-
tise so that an individual may testify as an expert. See e.g. 
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 
U.S. 814 (1989); State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). 
In interpreting the federal corollary to the Utah rule, one 
authority has stated: 
An expert must be shown by the party calling 
him to possess scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge. Whether the witness is 
sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter 
to be decided by the court, . . . . A witness 
will be qualified as an expert by reason of 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education. Under Rule 702, a witness may be 
qualified as an expert by virtue of any one such 
factor, or upon a culmination of any of the side 
factors. 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §702.2 at 619-21 (3d Ed. 
1991). 
After addressing the admissibility of blood spatter 
evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 
1208, 1212 (Idaho 1991), held that blood spatter analysis is a 
"well-recognized discipline." The court held that evidence pre-
sented in that case was admissible because, given the witnesses1 
extensive qualifications and experience in the specific field, 
"the trial court did not err in finding that there was sufficient 
foundation for these witnesses1 testimony and allowing them to 
testify." 812 P.2d at 1213. 
As a recognized discipline, blood spatter evidence is 
amenable to interpretation only by those people who are qualified 
in the field. In this case, defense counsel totally failed to 
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challenge Dr. Schnittker's qualification in the field of blood 
spatter evidence interpretation. Such a failure simply cannot be 
a tactical decision. Nothing was to be gained by allowing Dr. 
Schnittker's rebuttal testimony. Counsel's failure to challenge 
Dr. Schnittker's qualification to interpret such evidence can only 
be termed as deficient performance. 
The deficient performance was prejudicial to Ms. 
Goddard's case. Dr. Schnittker's testimony, as amply illustrated 
above, was crucial to the prosecutor's repudiation of Ms. 
Goddard's testimony. Critical to Dr. Schnittker's testimony was 
her interpretation of the blood spatters at the scene and on the 
clothing of both the victim and the defendant. This testimony was 
given despite the fact that Dr. Schnittker apparently had not per-
sonally examined the crime scene or the evidence prior to trial. 
(R. 142) (Addendum F) Had she not been allowed to testify as an 
expert in the area of blood spatter evidence, Dr. Schnittker would 
have been unable to provide what she considered to be the most 
compelling flaw in the defendant's testimony, i.e. that the shirt 
which the defendant was wearing did not have any blood spatters on 
the front of it. If Dr. Schnittker's blood spatter testimony is 
subtracted from the evidence, the entire evidentiary picture is 
changed. No compelling reasons for disbelieving the defendant are 
offered by the prosecution. Therefore, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome would have been different. 
C. Ms. Goddard's Trial Counsel Was Ineffective Because She Failed 
to Object to the Prosecution's Repeated Questions of the Defendant 
Asking Why Other Witnesses Would Lie. 
./n_ 
At several points during the prosecutor's cross-
examination of Ms. Goddard, the prosecutor asked Ms. Goddard why 
other witnesses would lie. (R. 178 at 447, 448, 449) In response 
to each of these questions, Ms. Goddard could offer no explanation 
why another witness would lie during his or her testimony. These 
questions drew no objection from defense counsel. 
In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 
1992), this Court addressed the issue of a prosecutor's questions 
to a defendant concerning the defendant's implied claims that 
another witness was lying. The Court stated: 
Several courts have noted that it is improper to 
ask a criminal defendant to comment on the verac-
ity of another witness. The question is improper 
because it is argumentative and seeks information 
beyond the witness's competence. The prejudicial 
effect of such a question lies in the fact that 
it suggests to the jury that a witness is commit-
ting perjury even though there are other explana-
tions for the inconsistencies. In addition, it 
puts the defendant in the untenable position of 
commenting on the character and motivations of 
another witness who may appear sympathetic to the 
jury. This question, therefore, was also 
improper. 
It is not necessary to address how these 
questions affected the trial, given our previous 
holdings. However, we feel again compelled to 
note that prosecutors have a duty to eschew all 
improper tactics. 
184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (footnotes and citations omitted). Given 
the magnitude of the error and the "untenable position" which such 
question puts the defendant in, defense counsel's failure to 
object to such questioning cannot be a tactical decision. Defense 
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counsel simply cannot make the choice to make the defendant appear 
less sympathetic to the jury by having to explain why another wit-
ness would lie. A failure to object to such questioning is defi-
cient performance. 
When the chilling effect of the questions propounded by 
the prosecutor is taken in concert with the other deficiencies of 
defense counsel in failing to exclude or explain Dr. Schnittker's 
testimony, the entire evidentiary picture of the trial is 
effected. Indeed, the questions propounded by the prosecutor 
question the veracity of testimony offered by Christine Grogan, 
Frank Gutierrez and Beth Steed. These witnesses arguably provided 
evidence which indicated Ms. Goddardfs mental state prior to the 
homicide. By diminishing Ms. Goddard's credibility with the jury 
while at the same time bolstering the credibility of the other 
three witnesses, the prosecutor promoted his claim that the homi-
cide was an intentional act by Ms. Goddard. Had defense counsel 
interposed a timely objection, Ms. Goddard's credibility would not 
have been diminished in the eyes of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Teri 
Goddard respectfully requests that this Court reverse her convic-
tion and remand for a new trial or dismissal of the charge. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. 
TERI LIN GODDARD 4/17/54, 
Defendant(s). 
Screened by: R. Ybarra 
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The undersigned Detective J. Mendez - SLCPD under oath 
states on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNT I 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a First Degree 
Felony, at 1235 LaFayette Drive, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about June 2, 1990, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 
V\t>\ X 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, TERI LIN 
y -\)A GODDARD, a party to the offense, intentionally or 
i^ %T \ knowingly caused the death of Derek Hall, and/or 
gs*F intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
v, v\ committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
.«^ v caused the death of Derek Hall, and/or acting under 
p circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human 
life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
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INFORMATION 
STATE v. TERI LIN GODDARD 
County Attorney #90 1 80709/01 
Page 2 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officers: R. Hawke, R. Linton, S. Cheever, W. Poulsen, J. Candland, 
J. Campbell, C. Oliver and J. Mendez. 
Others: Jay Jackson, Sharon Schnittker, Brent Marchant, Pillar 
Shortsleeve, Brenda Christensen, Louise Miyetake, Beth 
Steed, Tom Flolks, Dick Droubay and Christine Grogan. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, a Salt Lake City Police Detective, bases this 
Information on their reports, Case No. 90-052813, which he has read, 
and his personal investigation which disclosed the following: 
1. The report of Officer R. Linton of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department to the effect that on June 2, 1990, upon responding 
to a dispatch of a fight entered the residence at 1235 Lafayette 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, upon the insistence of the defendant and 
discovered the body of a deceased male adult. 
2. The report of Officer Sterling Hamner of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department to the effect that at the above-mentioned 
location and date he observed the defendant setting on the porch of 
the house with a fishing knife lying next to her. The knife was 
later taken into evidence and is a fishing filet knife with a four 
inch blade. 
3. The report of Officer Robert D. Hawke of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department to the effect that the above-described 
deceased individual had a single puncture wound to the center of his 
chest. Officer Hawke was able to identify the deceased by his Utah 
State Driver's License as Derek G. Hall. 
4. An Autopsy performed by Dr. Sharon Schnittker, Utah 
State Medical Examiner, on the deceased disclosed that the cause of 
death was a single puncture wound to the aorta. Dr. Schnittker 
opines that due to the nature of the wound, the stabbing was non 
accidental. No other signs of wounds or trauma were found on the 
body. 
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Page 3 
5. A review of the Salt Lake City Dispatch tape concerning 
the above-described incident discloses the defendant's statement, "I 
stabbed himi I think he's dead!" 
6. The oral statement of Ms. Christine Grogan to the Salt 
Lake City Police Department complaint taker to the effect that the 
defendant had been running up and down the street screaming, "I 
killed him! I killed him!" 
7. Your affiant responded to the scene of the homicide 
which disclosed no evidence of a fight or struggle other than one 
chair which appeared to have been overturned as the victim fell. 
Authorized for presentment and 
filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney 






BROOKE C. WELLS (3421) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




TERI LIN GODDARD, : Case No. 901901103FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, TERI LIN GODDARD, by and 
through counsel of record and moves this Court for an Order 
pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
arresting the judgment rendered against the Defendant on 
October 11, 1990 by an eight-member jury. The Defendant bases 
this Motion on the grounds that the facts proved do not 
constitute the offense of Second Degree Homicide, that the 
testimony on which the State based its case was in major part 
based upon the incredible opinion testimony of the Assistant 
Medical Examiner, and that the interests of justice are not 





best served by entering judgment against the Defendant for 
Second Degree Homicide. 
/ 
SUBMITTED this l& day of October, 1990. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on 
the / ^ ^ d a y otQ//i^Q/^j . 1990 at the hour of j?S3aa~m. 
before the Honorable David S. Young, Third District Court Judge. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this /* day of October/ 1990. 
MAI LED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Rodwicke Ybarra, Deputy County Attorney, Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 





Thire Judicial District 
DEC 7 1990 
6ALT LKifte COUIVI Y TH 
BROOKE C. WELLS (3421) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. ay. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 0»putyCI«rk 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERI LIN GODDARD, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
OF SENTENCING DATE, 
RENEWED MOTION FOR ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 901901103FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COMES NOW the defendant, TERI LIN GODDARD, by and 
through her counsel of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves this 
Court to continue the date of defendant's scheduled sentencing, 
arrest the judgment of conviction rendered against the 
defendant for the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the 
Second Degree, a first degree felony, or in the alternative 
order a new trial. Defendant's motions are made pursuant to 
Rules 23 and 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and are 
hereby filed prior to the imposition of sentence presently 
scheduled for December 7, 1990. 
Defendant's motions are made based upon defendant's 
recent discovery of potential exculpatory forensic evidence not 
previously available to defendant which is expected to 
GOiS-d 
contradict the findings of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the State's 
key trial witness/ that defendant's theory that the death of 
Derek Hall could not have occurred accidentally. However, as 
allowed by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
defendant needs additional time to secure supporting affidavits 
from Dr. Judith Bunker, forensic expert in the area of blood 
analysis, after she conducts further forensic testing in her 
laboratory located in Orlando, Florida and needs approximately 
30 days to complete testing and prepare a report with 
supporting affidavit. Additionally, based upon the written 
findings of Dr. Bunker, the defense expects to present her 
findings to others involved in the investigation and trial of 
defendant. Their affidavits may also be submitted to the Court 
in support of defendant's motion. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court continue defendant's sentencing and set 
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motions after review of 
defendant's affidavits which the defendant expects to provide 
to the Court on or before January 31, 1991, after which a 
hearing date could be scheduled. 
DATED this / day of DecemBSlr, 1990. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
UMb 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Rodwicke 
Ybarra, Deputy County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 this / day ©f>pecember, 1990. 
- 3 -
ADDENDUM D 
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BROOKS C. WELLS (3421) 
Attorney fox Defendant
 rr-. -Y rLEbx 
SAL? LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. ^ * 
424 East SOO South, Suite 300 
salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
HI TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COOMTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TBS STATS OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERI LYKK GODDARD, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IK SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 901901103FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. XOUNO 
I, JUDITH L. &UKKER, affiant herein do hereby 
acknowledge and certify as follows: 
1. X have expertise and training in th* area of 
Forensic case Analysis, including analysis of blood spatter 
evidence, (A copy of ay Curriculum Vita is attached and by 
reference aade a part hereof). 
2* I was retained by the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association to analyse and review blood spatter evidence 
presented by the State of Utah against the defendant in the 
ease of State v. Terl Lvnn aaAa***. 
APR 24 'SI lit 18 SSI 364 0913 PAGE.082 00150 
APR-24-1991 18U7 FROM KHUD'S S.L.C. 1 TO 13B32785S52 P.03 
3. I have personally examined autopsy reports, 
photographs, clothing, a svivel rocker, police reports, the 
trial testimony of Teri Lynn ooddard and Dr. Sharon sehnittXer, 
Assistant Utah Xedical Examiner, as veil as the entirety of the 
trial transcript including arguments of both counsel for the 
State and the defense setting forth their respective theories. 
4« Based on the evidence provided, X conclude that 
the blood spatter evidence is consistent with the trial 
testimony and explanation of Teri Lynn Goddard and inconsistent 
with the theory argued by the State's attorney and the trial 
testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittkor» 
5- A copy of my report is attached hereto and by 
reference made a part hereof, 
DATED this W day of April, 1991. 
forensic consultant 
STATE 07 FLORIDA ) 
County of Uti^MSr^hu) 
On the S?¥ day of April, 1991, personally appeared 
before me, JODITE L. BUNK8B. the signer of the foregoing 
lnstrtttient, who duly acknowledged to no that she executed the 
'fa LM& NOTARY PUBETD' Vt^tf - / O 
Residing inP., JZfePJk*^ (J/) XatfA / 
My Caagission Expires: d- 0JO~9^ ? > ' • ? 
TOTflL P. 
APR H4 f 9 l 11M8 801 364 0913 PAGE, 003 
J.L. BUNKER & ASSOCIATES 
AN AFFILIATION OF FORENSIC CONSULTANTS 
POST OFFICE BOX 551 • ORLANDO. FLORIDA 32802 
( 4 0 7 ) 880-8149 
REPORT OF ANALYSIS 
• RECONSTRUCTION 
• EXPERT TESTIMONY 
• INTERROGATORIES 












Brooke Wells# Trial Counsel 
Salt lake Legal Defender Association 
Judith L. Bunker, Forensic Consultant 
April 14, 1991 
State v Teri Goddard 
Case No. 901901103FS 
Derek Hall, Deceased 6/2/90 
Subject found dead from stab wound of 
chest. Study photographs and other 
evidence to establish position(s) of 
persons and objects during and following 
bloodshed. 
Original and Supplementary Police 
Reports, Salt Lake City Police Dept. 
Autopsy Protocol - Dr. Schnittker 
10 color photographs, scene & morgue 
Trial testimony - Dr. Schnittker 
Remainder of trial transcript 
Evidence as follows: 
Exhibit 27-S - Sweatshirt 
28-S - Bluejearns 
29-S - Bluejeans 
16-S - Swivel Rocker 
NOTE: Case file was submitted to this office by Investigator 
Dennis Couch on November 26, 1990. The clothing and chair 
were examined at the Salt Lake City Courthouse on December 4, 
1991. The complete trial transcript was submitted to this 
Office on March 28, 1991. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
Subject, Derrick Hall, was found dead on the living room 
floor of his residence on June 2, 1990, having suffered a 
stab wound to the chest. This incident occurred following an 
altercation between the subject and his roommate, Teri Lin 
Goddard. 
G0: 
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AUTOPSY: 
Cause of death is a single stab wound to the chest. The 
wound track is front to back and horizontal and slightly 
right to left. This wound penetrated the anterior ascending 
aorta, producing a cardiac tamponade. A significant finding 
was a superficial cut at the base of the left second finger. 
Toxicology studies revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.16 mg% 
PHOTOGRAPHS: 
The photographs describe bloodshed confined to the overturned 
rocker and the body. The rocker is seen lying on its back. 
It was reportedly repositioned by rescue personnel. 
Subsequent photographs of the upright chair describe 
bloodstaining of the right armrest. (See examination) The 
body is lying supine with both knees bent toward the torso. 
There is blood flow upward from the wound, associated with 
the subject's descent to the floor. There is smearing or 
smudging of blood around the wound site. The hands appear to 
be free of bloodstaining. 
CLOTHING: 
27-S Sweatshirt! This is a melon colored sweatshirt, 
Tultex brand, size small, 50% cotton 50% 
acrylic. Blood stains are confined to 
the back of the right sleeve. The oval 
to elliptical appearing stains are 
directed laterally and downward. They 
range in size from 6 mm to 10 mm in 
diameter representing blood flow from 
above. Two larger stains measuring 
approximately 20 mm have been smeared 
while wet. 
28-S Bluejeans: These blue jeans, size 34, were removed 
from Teri Goddard. There are two oval 
appearing stains on right lower leg, lo-
ll11 above the hemline, measuring 5mm to 
6mm in diameter. Otherwise, the front of 
the jeans are free of staining. 
STATE V GODDARD 
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The back of the jeans contain transfer 
patterns. There are elliptical and 
linear stains on the right hip which 
correspond to stains seen on the rocker 
arm. There are elliptical and linear 
stains seen on the left hip which also 
correspond to the stained rocker arm. 
The right lower leg contains circular to 
oval appearing transfer stains associated 
with smudging which also correspond to 
the stains seen on the rocker arm. 
29-S Bluejeans: These bluejeans were removed from the 
body. There are no labels. A total of 9 
stains are observed on the front of 
the left lower leg 12 - 15w above the 
hem. One stain measures 20 mm. with the 
remainder ranging in size from 3 - 7 mm. 
These stains were not visible in the 
photographs. These stains represent 
blood dropped from above. 
16-S Chair: This gold colored stuffed swivel rocker 
measures 17" from floor to cushion, 6" 
from cushion to top of arm rest, 28" from 
cushion to top of backrest and is 28" 
wide. 
The front of the right arm rest is 
stained by blood flow from above and 
liquid blood in direct contact with the 
fabric. These stains are associated with 
smudging or swiping while the blood is 
still wet. The liquid blood transfer 
continues across the inner arm, breaking 
into droplets toward the backrest 
describing a cast-off pattern from front 
to back, laterally. The inner fabric of 
the cushion below the armrest is also 
stained. 
NOTE: Color photographic slides were taken to document 
bloodstain evidence on clothing and rocker. 
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CONCLUSIONS: The following conclusions are based solely 
upon the evidence provided. There is no report that serology 
studies were conducted on any of these items. Considering 
that this incident involved only one blood source, the 
following conclusions and observations are submitted: 
1. Subject was directly above and in contact with the front 
of the right armrest when blood flowed from his wound, 
prior to falling back onto the floor. 
2. The stains located on the inner armrest near the 
backrest indicate the rocker was on its back when this 
bloodshed occurred. 
3. The location of the rocker stains along with the final 
body position strongly suggest the subject was on his 
knees when the wound was inflicted. This is also 
suggested by the presence of flow on subject's left 
lower pant leg. 
4. Ms. Goddard was in the rccker when bloodshed occurred. 
Her right arm wac in front of her when blood flowed onto 
the back of her sleeve from above. 
5. She removed herself from the rocker by climbing over the 
right armrest, transferring blood stains and patterns 
onto the back of her jearns. 
6. There is no bloodstain evidence to suggest that blood 
spurted or otherwise projected from the wound site at 
any point following the infliction of the wound. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Judith L. Bunker 
Forensic Consultant 
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Q And have you had particular — any particular 
training with regard to blood coagulation and congealing and 
that sort of thing? 
A Yes. 
Q Let me now show you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibits 8 and 9 for identification and ask you — you don't 
personally recognize these photographs, do you? 
A No, I don't. 
Q I ask you to consider hypothetically — well, let me 
first ask you, do you observe on the — what appears to be the 
arm of a.^air snmp hrnMnf reddish-brown stains? 
A Yes. 
0 Let me ask you to consider that if* those stains were 
hypothetically blood, and do you get a feeling from what you 
observe as to the amount of blood thatmjjtil" h? *"hprff? 
A Well, depends on how deeply it saturates. It's hard 
to make — it's not very much blood, You know, I'd say a small 
amount of blood in this particular occasion. It looks very 
superficial and not a large amount of blood. 
Q If that were, in fact, blood that was deposited on 
the arm of that chair, how — do you have an opinion as to how 
long that would remain liquid enough for it to continue to 
run? Do you understand my question? I don't know if I've 
exactly expressed it well. 
MS. WELLS: I would object without further 
j n r i V T?TM*7Ar>r*o 
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1 foundation. 
2 MR. YBARRA: I don't know what further foundation 
3 she wants for expertise. And I believe we have some 
4 stipulation in this regard. 
5 MS. WELLS: It's not a matter of her expertise, it's 
6 a matter of what information we have concerning the 
7 coagulation of blood, the amounts, all of those type of 
8 variables that would have to come into play before she could 
9 make any kind of a conclusion. 
10 MR. YBARRA: Well, I first want to find out if she 
11 has an opinion. If she doesn't, I won't even ask the 
12 question. I think I can ask whether or not she has an opinion 
13 in this regard. 
14 THE COURT: As to how long it would continue in a 
15 liquid state so it would run? 
16 MR. YBARRA: Such that it could run, yes. 
17 THE COURT: She may answer that question, she has 
18 the expertise. 
19 THE WITNESS: Well, I think that it sort of depends 
20 upon the material and, again, the amount of blood and so 
21 forth. It would be — it would be hard for me to say. It 
22 certainly would not be a very long time, because it's a thick 
23 material and it looks like a fairly thin layer of blood, so it 
24 really would — it would depend on this type of material. It 
25 would be hard for my to say. It would not be a very long 
n ^ n T m n T n T? Tzrm *v T? D C 
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period of time because it was absorbed by the material 
immediately. And really not — it's not like a smooth surface 
where the blood will continued to run, it has to seep through 
a rather thick looking material. 
0 (BY MR. YBARRA) So to be more specific and give an 
approximate time frame, you would need more specific 
information about the material and the quantity of blood? 
A I think one would have to experiment with that 
material and with a certain amount of blood similar to the 
patient's blood. I really wouldn't have any idea. 
Q But preliminarily you would think it would be a 
short period of time? 
MS. WELLS: Objection, she's answered and he's 
restating for her what her opinoin might have been. 
THE COURT: Yes, the last statement by Counsel may 
be stricken out. 
MR. YBARRA: Thank you. No further questions. Pass 
the witness. 
THE COURT: You may cross. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WELLS: 
Q Dr. Schnittker, you're not making any conclusion 
today about whether or not this wound was intentionally 
inflicted or not; is that right? 
A Based on the information that I had and the autopsy 
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I, DENNIS R. COUCH, affiant herein do hereby 
acknowledge and certify as follows: 
1. I am an investigator with the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. 
2. Prior to becoming employed with the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, I was a deputy with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office having been a detective in the Homicide 
Division from 1975 to 1990 where I was involved in the 
investigation of approximately 200 homicides. 
3. I have attended numerous homicide investigations 
and forensic evidence seminars during my employment as a 
homicide detective. 
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4. In my capacity as an Investigator with the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association I was assigned to assist Brooke 
C. Wells, attorney for Teri Lin Goddard, Defendant in the 
above-referenced case. 
5. Prior to the beginning of Defendant's trial on 
October 9, 1990, I reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript 
on the above-referenced case, all police reports and 
interviewed witnesses. The transcripts and reports indicated 
the State's theory was that while in a standing position Derek 
Hall, the deceased, was stabbed in the chest by the Defendant 
during a domestic altercation and that he then fell knocking 
over a chair on which he left blood spots dripping in the 
direction the chair was overturned. 
6. All pre-trial discovery and investigation 
indicated that the State had conducted no forensic examination 
or tests. 
7. I participated in Defendant's trial by assisting 
Ms. Wells at counsel table. 
8. Based upon pre-trial interviews with the State and 
observations of the chair and the Defendant's clothing I 
concluded, based upon my experience, that the State's theory 
was incorrect and that the physical evidence was consistent 
with Defendant's statement that the death of Derek Hall was 
accidental and occurred while the Defendant, who was wielding a 
- 2 -
knife, was forced by Hall into a near prone position on her 
back in the questioned chair, while her hands were held against 
her body by Hall and that Hall fell forward onto the knife and 
onto the arm of the chair from a kneeling position between her 
legs after which she pushed him back and got out of the chair, 
probably tipping it over. 
9. At Defendant's trial, Defendant testified and 
demonstrated to the Court and jury how Hall's death occurred in 
a manner consistent with her previous statements to me. 
10. The State called as a rebuttal expert witness, 
Dr. Sharon Schnittker, who testified without benefit of any 
pre-trial personal or forensic examination of the crime scene, 
the chair or clothes in question, that Defendant's testimony 
could not be true since blood could be expected to appear on 
the front of Defendant's sweatshirt (rather than on the sleeve 
where it did appear). 
11. To my knowledge there is no recognized expert in 
the area of blood spatter analysis within the State of Utah. 
12. Such rebuttal testimony came as a surprise to the 
defense as it was not based on any scientific review or 
examination of blood spatter or reports containing such 
information nor was Dr. Schnittker a recognized expert in the 
area. 
13. As a result of the verdict of guilty returned by 
the jury against Ms. Goddard, I contacted several jurors and 
- 3 -
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conducted interviews. The jurors indicated they relied upon 
the opinion of Dr. Schnittker, as an expert, that Defendants 
testimony was untruthful based primarily on the lack of blood 
on Defendant's sweatshirt. 
14. Based upon this information I located a 
nationally recognized blood spatter expert, Dr. Judith Bunker 
of Bunker and Associates of Orlando, Florida, concerning the 
blood spatter evidence of this case and the opinions rendered 
by Dr. Schnittker, a medical doctor, upon which the jury 
relied. 
15. On December 4, 1990, Dr. Bunker visited Salt Lake 
City to conduct a blood spatter seminar, attended by local 
police as well as Dr. Schnittker, and examined the questioned 
chair and clothing. She spent several hours photographing the 
items and conducting preliminary experiments to determine the 
validity of Dr. Schnittker's opinion and Defendant's 
explanation. 
16. Dr. Bunker's preliminary findings as explained to 
me are that the blood spatter evidence is consistent with an 
accidental killing as testified to by Defendant and 
inconsistent with the testimony and opinion of Dr. Sharon 
Schnittker. 
17. Dr. Bunker indicated a need to conduct scientific 
analysis only possible in a laboratory setting. 
- 4 -
18. Due to her prescheduled trial and work 
commitments, Dr. Bunker does not expect to be able to provide a 
preliminary report to the defendant prior to January 30, 1991, 
19. Dr. Bunker's report and affidavit will be 
submitted as soon as received by the defense. 
DATED this ZZ day of January, 1991. 
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On the ryCs^day of January, 1991, personally appeared 
before me, DENNIS R. COUCH# the signer of the foregoing 





. O BOTES M « 
My ConrniiBSiorijgRMalU 
r^ncco*— 
•mi 
NOTARY PUBLI 
Residing in 
es: 
- 5 -
OOii^ 
